fix: address review findings in the v2 stack fix PR
Board scaling: no sideways scrolling - Revert the pannable narrow canvas. The canvas fits the viewport again and `.viewport` goes back to `overflow: clip`, so a board can never widen the document or scroll horizontally. - Fix the unreadable-narrow-board regression at the real cause instead: cap the inverse UI compensation at 2x (50% canvas scale). Down to 50% text and controls keep their physical size; below it the board zooms out as a whole, so a 200x200 logical tile hosts at most 28px logical text rather than 96px and content stops overlapping its neighbours. Touch editing - Add `touch-action: none` to `.board-grid-entry`, the dnd-kit draggable and its own drag handle. The 200ms touch activation delay is useless if the browser has already handed the gesture to page panning and emitted `pointercancel`. Only edit mode renders this element. Custom widgets - Memoize the merged `data`/`status`/`options` passed to `CustomJsxRenderer`. They were rebuilt every render, so the compiled-template memo never hit and the new reference-identity boundary key changed on every render, resetting the error boundary and forcing an extra reconciliation of the widget subtree. - Keep the cache key when the shared Redis cache is unavailable so the process-local cache still absorbs polling instead of sending every widget refresh upstream. - Reclaim the shared cache's LRU/size/byte bookkeeping for TTL-expired entries and touch the LRU in the same script, so expired ghosts stop consuming the 64 MiB budget and a read costs one round trip instead of two. Forwarded IP - Restore `ipAddressFromHeaders` to the full forwarding chain and add `trustedIpAddressFromHeaders` for the last hop. Repointing the shared helper had collapsed MCP failed-auth rate limiting into a single bucket for every client behind a reverse proxy and replaced the client IP with the proxy IP in API-key auth logs. Runtime and restore - Make the new /appdata ownership migration best-effort. Under `set -e` a mount that rejects chown (CIFS/SMB, fixed-uid NFS) turned into a container that refuses to start, and /appdata was never chowned before. - Report malformed metadata.json as such instead of blaming the archive.
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@@ -10,12 +10,28 @@ export const userAgent = (headers: Headers) => {
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export type DeviceType = "console" | "mobile" | "tablet" | "smarttv" | "wearable" | "embedded" | undefined;
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/**
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* The client-reported forwarding chain, verbatim. Behind an additional reverse
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* proxy this still contains the originating client, so it is the useful value
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* for audit logging and diagnostics. A caller can put anything in front of the
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* chain, so never key a limit or quota on it.
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*/
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export const ipAddressFromHeaders = (headers: Headers): string | null => {
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return headers.get("x-forwarded-for");
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};
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/**
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* The last hop of the forwarding chain. The bundled nginx proxy appends its own
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* transport peer, so this is the only entry a caller cannot choose, which makes
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* it the right identity for rate limits and concurrency budgets.
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*
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* Behind an additional reverse proxy the last hop is that proxy, so every client
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* behind it shares one identity. Distinguishing them needs an explicit
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* trusted-proxy configuration, which Homarr does not have yet.
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*/
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export const trustedIpAddressFromHeaders = (headers: Headers): string | null => {
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const forwardedFor = headers.get("x-forwarded-for");
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if (!forwardedFor) return null;
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// The bundled nginx proxy appends the transport peer to this chain. Using
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// the last hop prevents a caller-controlled prefix from creating arbitrary
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// rate-limit identities.
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return forwardedFor.split(",").at(-1)?.trim() || null;
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};
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